The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to
affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing
sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and
operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force. War,
of course, in the broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include
substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the
Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects arising
from application of military power and were aimed at destroying the will of an
adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observations had been made by the great
Chinese military writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming
an adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a commander
could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial importance of achieving
Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending battle. He also observed that
"war is deception," implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged
through clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the
adversary's will, understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe
is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to examine
the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe affect an
adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or television screens, the
comatose and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments of World
War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and
expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage
of Desert Storm vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these
effects of battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how
Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to
force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the Clausewitzian
sense, such that the strategic aims and military objectives of the campaign will
achieve a political end. Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core
characteristics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance,
and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a
hierarchy of different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to
identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differentiate each
model as unique or important. At this stage, historical examples are offered.
However, in subsequent stages, a task will be to identify current and future
examples to show the effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the
next step in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability
packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force
structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how best each
form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and
compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the
actual application of our alternative force package. Then the mission capability
package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing
differing historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have
been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists
between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming Force," the
doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure. The aims of this
doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an
adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily
impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as
possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is
crucial to successful application.
There are several major criticisms and potential
weaknesses of this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers
of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and
18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be used jointly
or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capability.
In other words, this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces
attrition relationships even though command and control, logistical, and
supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a
platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of worthy
and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this doctrine,
justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will prove more difficult.
While it is clear that "system of systems" and other alternative
military concepts are under consideration, for the time being, these have not
replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It
should be noted, there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is
made to provide a comprehensive and detailed examination of possible
alternatives.
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting
large amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time
to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, especially
when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of decisive force to remote or
distant regions. Third, the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force
may outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces
needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the
performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time to field
newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense
sector. This will compound the tension between quality and quantity already
cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However, none should be
dismissed without fuller understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain
objectives that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is
that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a broader
spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to
a more comprehensive and integrated interaction among all the specific
components and units that produce aggregate military capability and must include
training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our technical and
industrial capacity. It is possible that in these resource, technical, and
commercial industrial areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility
that otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is "Hiroshima and
Nagasaki" noted earlier. The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and
Awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive
destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership
and public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic
objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment of this
capability against society and its values, called "counter-value" in
the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the
public will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, would
instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or
days.
The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and
rest in determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can actually
be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary impotent; to
destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and probably unachievably
low levels of societal destruction; and whether a political decision would be
taken in any case to use this type of capability given the magnitude of the
consequences and the risk of failure.
It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of Desert
Storm, similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between this
example and Desert Storm are through the totality of a society that would
be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of destruction and the speed
of imposing those strikes as occurred to those Japanese cities. This example of
shock, awe, and intimidation rests on the proposition that such effects must
occur in very short periods of time.
The next example is "Massive Bombardment."
This category of Shock and Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively
precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors
over time. It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the
adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which the enemy
is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the cumulative effect of
this application of destruction power that will ultimately impose sufficient
Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical means to resist, that an
adversary will be forced to accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted,
trench warfare of the First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe
of the Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and related
B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of 1972-73,
illustrate the application of massive bombardment.
Massive Bombardment, directed at largely
military-strategic targets, is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming
Force," even though political constraints make this example most unlikely
to be repeated in the future. There is also the option of applying massive
destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as
the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality marks the terms
of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance and
capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to resist that is the
central foundation of this example.
The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests
in the question of political feasibility and acceptability, and what
circumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive
bombardment. Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against
Kuwait could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock and
Awe. However, as with Overwhelming Force, this response is not time-sensitive
and would require massive application of force for some duration as well as
political support.
Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real
Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe were not achieved through the massive application of
firepower across a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of
force. Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly
focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. The
German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack across a very broad
front, although the opponent may have been deceived into believing that. Instead,
the enemy's line was probed in multiple locations and, wherever it could be most
easily penetrated, attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is
that of the shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a
tank's armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage
against the unarmored or less protected innards.
To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and
Awe is directed against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in
execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The adversary, finding
front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics, surrenders, or both.
Hitler's campaign in France and Holland and the seizure of the Dutch forts and
the occupation of Crete in 1940 are obvious illustrations. The use of Special
Operations forces in significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of
Shock and Awe.
Desert Storm
could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the attack were mounted without
the long preparatory bombardment and was concentrated in a single sector—either
the "left hook" or the Marine attack "up the middle," and
with total surprise. The major differences between the operation in Kuwait and
Germany's capture of France in 1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia had
complete military and technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once
under attack, Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the
coalition license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then
dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future adversaries
about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that they will face in us
an opponent able to employ technically superior forces with brilliance, speed,
and vast leverage in achieving Shock and Awe through the precise application of
force.
It must also be noted that there are certainly
situations such as guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to
obtain Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, the German
Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the Vietnam War,
where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be penetrated or selectively
savaged by this type of warfare.
The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its
strengths. Can brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible
enough infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the
supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the systems
to maintain this operational and technical superiority? Rapid Dominance requires
a positive answer to these questions, at least theoretically.
The fifth example is named after the Chinese
philosopher-warrior, Sun Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on
selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve Shock
and Awe. This discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this
from Hiroshima and Massive Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho
Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters on war and
proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the rules applied to women.
When the answer was yes, the king challenged Sun Tzu to turn the royal
concubines into a marching troop. The concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until
he had the head cut off the head concubine. The ladies still could not bring
themselves to take the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut
off a second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies
learned to march with the precision of a drill team.
The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and
Awe and hence compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal
and ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. The fundamental
values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is to convince the
majority that resistance is futile by targeting and harming the few. Both
society and the military are the targets. In a sense, Sun Tzu attempts to
achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe but through far more selective and
informed targeting. Decapitation is merely one instrument. This model can easily
fall outside the cultural heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful
without major refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see"
or to communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to
show useful wartime applications.
A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is
deception. In this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish
the enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the adversary.
The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the
adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is an early example of
deception. However, as we will see, the deception model may have new foundations
in the technological innovations that are occurring and in our ability to
control the environment.
The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of
the Massive Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable that a
decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real
assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to maintain
the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent on both resources
and on supporting intelligence, especially human intelligence—not an American
strong point.
Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example
and is distinct from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it focuses on
depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock and Awe. The image
here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to incapacitate an
adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light
and deafening noise. The result shocks and confuses the adversary and makes him
senseless. The aim in this example of achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so
much light and sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses,
and therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary becomes
impotent and entirely vulnerable.
A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that
encompasses large areas is a dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a
high altitude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and
electrical equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of
likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the ability to
communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable and perhaps more
achievable variant. This deprival of senses, including all electronics and
substitution of false signals or data to create this feeling of impotence, is
another variant. Above all, Shock and Awe are imposed instantly and the
mechanism or target is deprivation of the senses.
The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part
shortcomings of other approaches. Technological solutions are crucial but may
not be conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear weapons. Intelligence is
clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be stunned, this
example will not work.
The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the
"Haitian" example (or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It
is based on imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through
deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from the U.S.
intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native Haitians were seeking
to extricate their country from French control. The Haitian leaders staged a
martial parade for the visiting French military contingent and marched,
reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in review. The French were
deceived into believing that the native forces numbered in the tens of thousands
and concluded that French military action was futile and that its forces would
be overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their freedom
without firing a shot.
To be sure, there are points of similarity between the
Haitian example and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are more
crucial in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and perception
of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes closest to this one
except that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying force, it is clear that
imposing actual pain and shock are essential ingredients and deception,
disin-formation, and guile are secondary. Demonstrative uses of force are also
important. The issue is how to determine what demonstrations will affect the
perceptions of the intended target in line with the overall political aims.
The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major
dependency on intelligence. One must be certain that the will and perceptions of
the adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the adversary who is
not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the unintended
actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait
demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can backfire. Saddam simply let his
bluff be called.
The next example is that of "The Roman Legions."
Achieving Shock and Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary
through the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own
invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a
considerable period of time. The target set encompasses both military and
societal values. In occupying a vast empire stretching from the Atlantic to the
Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of forces to secure each of
these territories. In the first place, Roman forces were far superior to native
forces individually and collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act
occurred, the perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately
would take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat Diplomacy" of
the nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of any
crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the wholesale
destruction of offending villages.
There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to
achieve Shock and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the perception of
that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most
significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to exact a
severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of Damocles would
descend, were essential ingredients. The distinction between this category and
the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving Shock and Awe. In the other
categories, there is the need for seizing the initiative and applying
con-temporaneous force to achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the
Shock and Awe have already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or
the rise of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use of
force.
The major shortcoming is the assumption of the
inevitability of reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not
and may not always be the case with the United States, although we can attempt
to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy in Tehran by
dissident "students" in 1979 and American impotence in the aftermath
are suggestive of the shortcoming. That aside, the example or perception of the
invincibility of American military power is not a bad one to embellish.
The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed
the Decay and Default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown
over a lengthy period but without the application of massive destruction. This
example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In this example, both military
and societal values are targets. Selective and focused force is applied. It is
the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in the system and
society that ultimately compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms.
Shock and Awe are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing
the end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and aggravate
the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not threaten the
entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese water torture, a drop at a
time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the preoccupation with the decay and
disruption of society produces a variant of Shock and Awe in the form of
frustration collapsing the will to resist.
The significant weakness of this approach is time
duration. In many cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock and
Awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or
politically acceptable means.
The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian
Mounted Police," whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where
you can send a bullet." The distinction between this example and the others
is that this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that
standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the required
objectives. There should not be too fine a point, however, in belaboring
differences with the other examples in this regard over standoff. A stealthy
aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a cruise missile fired at
1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance on target.
A few observations about these examples offer insights
on which to test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear
that the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial,
infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In certain cases,
time is the crucial consideration in imposing Shock and Awe and in most of the
examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden imposition of Shock and Awe. However,
in several examples, the effects of Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative.
They are either achieved over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and
experiences. Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new
technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is the extent
to which brilliance and competence in using force, in understanding where an
adversary's weak points lie and in executing military operations with deftness,
are vital. While this recognition is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting
brilliance and therefore on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or
institutionalized and is not a function only of gifted individuals.
There is also a key distinction between selective or
precise and massive application of force. Technology, in the form of "zero
CEP" weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems
that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive
disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss of power
grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. Loss of all
communications can have a massively destructive impact even though physical
destruction can be relatively limited.
In some of the examples, the objective is to apply
brutal levels of power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt to
keep war "immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one
point should not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman
put it, "war is hell." While there are surely humanitarian
considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to Shock and
Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm.
The Clausewitzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is dismissed only
at our peril.
For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and
the concerned Member of Congress with responsibility for providing for the
common defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies? First,
there are always broader sets of operational concepts and constructs available
for achieving political objectives than may be realized. Not all of these
alternatives are necessarily better or feasible. However, the examples suggest
that further intellectual and conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in
dealing with national security options in the future.
Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a
constraint in generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally
viewed as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to arrive "firstest
with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to ensure we had
ample forces on station should they be required. Rapid Dominance would alleviate
many of these constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effective
forces far more quickly. Therefore, in this case, we can view time as an ally.
The political issue rests in longstanding arguments to limit the President from
having the capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation
without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is an
obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force packages
derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and experimentation. Indeed,
our experience with nuclear weapons and emergency release procedures shows that
delegating instant presidential authority can be handled responsibly.
Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria
of several models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal
is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. It is
also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important attributes
in war, there are no guarantees that they can be institutionalized in any
military force.
Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress
relates to the Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High
Powered Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability to
incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these weapons, the
nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather than using this
illustrative system to achieve hard target kill because there were few hard
targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like systems have been and are being carefully
researched.
Finally, to return to the idea that deception,
disinformation, and misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid
Dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using complete
signature management, larger formations could be made to look like smaller and
smaller formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier battle groups could be
disguised and smaller warships could be made to appear as large formations. This
signature management would apply across the entire spectrum of the senses and
not just radar or electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate
what information and intelligence are both available and not available to the
adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It is control in
the fullest sense of the word.
The next step is to match the four significant
characteristics that define Rapid Dominance— knowledge, rapidity, brilliance,
and control—with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in order
to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces and force packages
accordingly, and determine those integrated systems and innovative uses of
technologies and capabilities that will provide the necessary means to achieve
these objectives in conditions that include both the MRC and OOTW.
THE BOTTOM LINE THE BOTTOM LINE THE BOTTOM LINE THE BOTTOM LINE THE BOTTOM LINE THE BOTTOM LINE